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Abstract
This paper challenges the usual objections to the possibility of applying the rental equivalent
approach to determine the weight that nonrental housing services should have in the Consumer
Price Index (CPI). Using data from two Spanish household budget surveys, it is shown that
market rents can be well represented in terms of an index of housing quality, two geographical
variables, and the year of occupancy. This parsimonious empirical model is used to impute a
rental value to nonrental housing units, taking into account the possible selection bias induced
by systematic differences in housing characteristics between the market rental sector and the
nonrental stock. On average, the estimated hedonic values are relatively close to the self-
imputations provided in the household surveys by the occupants of such dwellings. Therefore,
using either of the two alternatives to assess the importance of nonrental housing services in
the CPI have small consequences for inflation. Instead, dropping these services from the CPI
creates a downward bias in the measurement of inflation of 0.33 percentage points per year
during 1985–1992, and an upward bias of 0.38 percentage points per year during 1993 to 2000.
(JEL: C43, D12, R21, C21, E31)
1. Introduction
In most countries, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) is used every year to index
many public expenditure programs, as well as tax brackets, personal exemptions,
and other features of the income tax. Moreover, it is often used as a basic reference
in wage negotiations in the private and public sectors. Finally, it serves to express,
in real terms, money measures of aggregate consumption, labor earnings, and the
poverty line. Therefore, even a small error in the CPI during extended periods of
time may cause havoc in any economy.
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This paper analyzes the possible bias caused by the treatment of housing
in the CPI, one of the more vexing problems for theorists, official statisticians,
central bankers, and other users of this fundamental statistic. The difficulty is
that, in the absence of observable transactions between owners and users of hous-
ing services, it is not obvious at all (i) how to determine the weight to be given
to owner-occupied housing in the CPI; and (ii) exactly which prices should be
monitored over time. Lacking clear answers to these questions, many countries
exclude nonrental housing from the CPI. Among European countries, for exam-
ple, Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain
have adopted this approach. This is also the case of the Harmonized Index of
Consumer Prices (HICP), the official indicator of inflation in the EU produced by
Eurostat. Given the large differences in the proportion of nonrental housing across
countries, dropping its services from the HICP makes inflation rates essentially
noncomparable across the EU, a situation that makes it harder to conduct and
evaluate European monetary policy.
This paper presents new evidence from Spain about the possibility of using
the rental equivalent approach to solve the first of the described two problems.1
Two radically different ways of imputing a rental value to each nonrental housing
unit lead to practically indistinguishable inflation rates for 1985–2000. In com-
parison, dropping those services from the CPI leads to an important bias in the
measurement of inflation during the 1985–2000 period.
To introduce the issues involved, accept that the economic approach to index
number theory provides the conceptual framework for the country’s CPI.2 This
approach suggests that the relevant commodity to be included in the CPI is the
flow of housing services provided by the nonrental housing stock. As Triplett
(2001, p. F327) indicates with respect to owner-occupied housing: “The concept
of consumption implies that the standard of living depends on the consumption
of housing services, and not on the purchase of houses.” In turn, according to the
rental equivalent approach, to price this flow there are two alternatives.3
The first is to simply ask occupants (or experts) the rent they think that
the dwellings in question could carry in the rental market. Self-imputations by
occupants and expert judgments are currently used in the US and the Netherlands,
1. As pointed out in Diewert (2003), the rental equivalent approach can be traced back to Marshall
(1898, p. 594) at least, and it is the approach taken for owner-occupied housing by most countries in
the system of National Accounts; see Eurostat, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, OECD,
and United Nations (1993).
2. This is actually the case in the US, the Netherlands, and Sweden (United States Department of
Labor 1997; Balk 1994; Dalén 1999). For in-depth discussions of the superiority of this position
versus the alternatives advocated by Hill (1999) and Turvey (1999), see Triplett (2001) and Diewert
(2000). For alternatives to the economic approach in the housing sector, such as the net acquisition
and payment approaches, see Turvey (1989, 2000).
3. Within the economic approach, an alternative way of estimating the opportunity costs of nonrental
housing is the user cost approach. See, for instance, Smith, Rosen, and Fallis (1988), Diewert (2003)
and Triplett (2001), as also note 22.
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respectively, to determine the official weight assigned to owner-occupied housing
services in the CPI. In Spain, self-imputations are collected in the household
budget surveys known as Encuestas de Presupuestos Familiares (EPF), gathered
by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) with the main purpose of estimating
the official weights of the Spanish CPI. These rental values were used in the CPI
systems based in 1976 and 1983. However, possibly because the prices of the
housing stock had been through an upward cycle since Spain joined the EU in
1986, the self-imputed values collected in the 1990–1991 EPF were thought to
be too high, and nonrental housing services were eliminated from the CPI system
based on 1992 (see Castro (1992), the spokesman for the INE at the time).
The second alternative is to use hedonistic regression methods to estimate
rental values for nonrental housing from information collected on housing char-
acteristics for the whole stock and on observed rents in the market rental sector.
The usual objection to this procedure is that rent controls or public subsidized
rents interfere with the workings of the rental housing sector, or that the character-
istics of the dwellings of a very thin market rental sector are not representative of
those of a very large nonrental housing stock. Spain is a case in point. The market
rental sector only represents 8.9% and 5.3% of permanently occupied residen-
tial housing in 1980–1981 and 1990–1991, respectively. This small sector, which
is still partly regulated, operates under the influence of a rent controlled and a
publicly subsidized rental sector. In the other side of the spectrum, a dominant
nonrental sector represents 71.1% and 85.0% of the housing stock in 1980–1981
and 1990–1991, respectively.
Under these conditions it would appear that, whatever its conceptual merits,
the rental equivalence approach to the determination of a CPI weight to nonrental
housing services is bound to fail in practice. Therefore, the scene is set for the
experiment conducted in this paper. In the first place, the hedonic approach to
the task of imputing rental values to nonrental housing services is applied to the
information in the 1980–1981 and 1990–1991 EPFs. Second, the hedonic rental
values (“objectively”) imputed to nonrental housing are compared with the self-
imputations (“subjectively”) suggested by the occupants.4 Finally, the official
inflation from August 1985 to December 2000 is compared with the inflation that
would be obtained if the CPI weights for nonrental housing had been constructed
using our hedonic estimates.
From a methodological perspective, the hedonic imputation method advo-
cated in this paper introduces two novelties upon the traditional procedure. First,
multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) is used to select the linear combi-
nation of physical attributes that accounts for the maximum variance in this
4. This is what is done in Francois (1989), who used the traditional hedonic approach with a sample
of new tenants only. Alternatively, Kurz and Hoffmann (2004) compared the results of applying
the hedonic approach to rents in the market rental sector and to self-imputations provided by the
occupants in the owner-occupied sector. For their results, see footnote 17.
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multiple-dimensional space for the entire housing stock. It is shown that this
scalar index can be interpreted as a housing quality index, and that it provides
as good an explanation of market rents in 1980–1981 as the usual alternative
where all physical attributes are included as separate regressors. This justifies our
choice of the more parsimonious model to also analyze the 1990–1991 data. Sec-
ond, this paper recognizes the possible interdependence between the choices of
tenure mode and housing characteristics. To correct for the possible selection bias
caused by systematic differences in housing characteristics between the market
rental sector and the nonrental housing stock, a Heckman procedure is used for
the first time in this context.
From an empirical point of view, the most remarkable result of the paper is the
broad agreement between the hedonic rental values and the self-imputations for
nonrental housing services. On average, hedonic values in 1980–1981 are 12%
higher, and in 1990–1991 they are 13% lower, than self-imputed values. Therefore,
using either of the two alternatives to assess the importance of nonrental housing
services in the CPI system has very small consequences for inflation. Instead,
if the rental equivalence approach is abandoned and nonrental housing services
are dropped from the CPI, the weight of the “nonrental housing” commodity
goes down by about 10 percentage points. Given that housing prices rose by less
than the prices of the remaining commodities in the CPI from August 1985 to
December 1992 and by more than the remaining commodities from January 1993
to December 2000, inflation without nonrental housing services would have been
0.33 percentage points per year higher during the first period and 0.38 percentage
points per year lower during the second period.
The rest of the paper consists of four sections and an Appendix devoted to
the construction of the housing quality index. Section 2 presents the minimum
information on the institutional background and data sources that are necessary
to understand the task at hand. Section 3 serves two purposes: (i) It compares
the traditional hedonic model for the explanation of market rents with an alter-
native in which a vector of physical attributes is substituted for a housing quality
index; and (ii) It presents the regression results in a model that takes into account
the possible interdependence between the choices of tenure mode and physical
attributes. Section 4 compares the hedonic estimates with the self-imputed values
provided by their occupants, and studies the consequences for inflation of using
the hedonic estimates to determine the weight of nonrental housing services in
the CPI. Section 5 concludes.
2. Institutional Background and Data Sources
As indicated in the Introduction, the data sources for this paper are the 1980–1981
and 1990–1991 EPFs collected from April 1980 to March 1981, and from April
1990 to March 1991, respectively. These two household budget surveys consist
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Table 1. Permanent residential housing by tenure mode and legal status in the 1980–1981
and 1990–1991 EPFs. Sample and population statistics.
1980–1981 EPF 1990–1991 EPF
Tenure mode Sample Population % Sample Population %
I. Rental housing 5,484 2,297,105 22.9 2,975 1,694,184 15.0
1. Market sector 2,181 888,945 8.9 1,061 601,970 5.3
2. Rent controlled 968 405,290 4.0 229 129,968 1.1
3. Public housing 1,787 773,164 7.7 771 426,875 3.9
4. Unknown legal status 535 223,795 2.2 914 535,371 4.7
II. Owner-occupied 16,427 6,928,150 69.1 16,623 8,789,287 77.8
5. Market sector 9,307 4,104,814 41.0 9,132 4,883,659 43.2
6. Public housing 5,316 2,048,206 20.4 5,222 2,676,098 23.7
7. Unknown legal status 1,804 775,130 7.7 2,269 1,229,530 10.9
III. Other 2,060 798,911 8.0 1,557 815,038 7.2
All 23,971 10,024,166 100.0 21,155 11,298,509 100.0
Note: This sector I includes 13 sample observations, representative of 5,911 housing units at the population level, that
cannot be classified in the market or the rent controlled sector because they lack information on the year of first occupancy.
of 23,971 and 21,155 observations, respectively, representative of the household
population occupying non institutional, or residential housing in all of Spain. This
population is around 10 million and 11.3 million households in 1980–1981 and
1990–1991, respectively. The INE provides a set of blowing up factors to con-
vert sample statistics into population statistics. Both EPFs heavily underestimate
the amount of secondary housing recorded in the 1981 and 1991 Housing Cen-
suses, but cover approximately 96% of permanently occupied residential housing.
Therefore, only the latter will be studied herein.5
To understand the problem addressed in this paper, it is essential to classify
the housing stock according to both tenure mode and the legal status determined
by public policies in the housing sector. As can be seen in Table 1, three tenure
modes are distinguished. Rented dwellings and dwellings occupied by their own-
ers constitute the rental and the owner-occupied sector, respectively. In the third
mode, referred to as the “Other” note, occupants do not own or rent the dwellings,
but use them either as wages in kind or as a transfer from a public organism, a
private institution or an individual person.
As far as the legal status is concerned, in Spain, as in other countries, govern-
ment intervention in the housing sector takes many forms. For our purposes, it will
suffice to describe the stylized features of two major policies. In the first place,
the public sector has entirely financed some housing construction but, starting
from the 1950s, most government intervention has operated through a variety of
programs that provide incentives to housing construction by means of moderate
5. All of the information used in this paper has been made accessible at http://www.eco.
uc3m.es/epf80-81.html and http://www.eco.uc3m.es/epf90-91.html. For sampling methods and a
full description of the data, see Instituto National de Estadística (1983, 1992).
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direct subsidies, low interest rates, or fiscal credits to the producers. Complex
public regulations, the details of which need not be discussed here, mandate that
housing built under these policies are rented or sold below market prices. As a
result of this type of government intervention, some housing units in the rental
and the owner-occupied sectors will be classified as public housing (see rows 3
and 6 in Table 1, respectively).
Within the owner-occupied sector, all private housing units integrate what
might be called the market sector (row 5). However, due to the public policy
known as rent control, in the rental sector this is not the case. Together with the
compulsory renewal clause on all leases, which dates from 1920, a 1946 law
systematically froze all rentals at the level reached at the time of the first con-
tract, following up on transitory regulations in the same vein already in effect
in previous years. A 1964 law sanctioned a dramatic policy change: Although
lease renewals were still compulsory, rents in new contracts were allowed to be
determined by market forces; owners and renters were also allowed to include
rent revision clauses subject only to annual ceilings set by the government. How-
ever, for all housing rented before 1964, the power of rent revision remained
with the government and only moderate increases have been permitted. There-
fore, a distinction must be made between pre-1964 or rent-controlled housing
(row 2), and post-1964 or market rental housing (row 1) that resembles what
has been termed second-generation rent control in Arnott (1995) or tenancy
rent control in Basu and Emerson (2000). Within the period covered in this
paper, which extends until 1990–1991, legislation enforced since April 1986
did away with compulsory renewal clauses and completely liberalized the rental
sector.
Against this background, the problem addressed in the next section is how
to use the information on housing characteristics and rents in the market rental
sector in row I.1 of Table 1 (i.e., 2,181 and 1,061 observations in 1980–1981
and 1990–1991, respectively), to impute a rental value to all dwellings in the
nonrental housing sector for which the EPFs provide self-imputations made by
their occupants (i.e., rows II and III, or 18,487 and 18,180 observations in 1980–
1981 and 1990–1991, respectively).
3. Imputing Hedonic Rental Values to Nonrental Dwellings
In the hedonic approach to the study of heterogeneous, differentiated commodi-
ties, unobservable quality differences between two product varieties are assumed
to be well approximated by a set of observable physical attributes. This provides
the original rationale to explain product prices in terms of product characteris-
tics. Rosen (1974) established the microeconomic foundations of the approach
by means of a perfect competitive model in which the price of an indivisible,
differentiated product is jointly determined by the interaction of supply and
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demand for the product’s attributes. Although the underlying demand and supply
behavioral relations cannot be identified from the knowledge of product prices
and product characteristics, partial derivatives with respect to each characteristic
in a hedonic regression can be interpreted as the implicit marginal equilibrium
price of the attribute in question.6
As time goes by, some housing units become vacant and others remain
occupied. Rent inflation in this sector manifests itself through new contracts
on those units that become rented for the first time in each period. Rents on
dwellings that remain occupied grow in time as a consequence of rent renewal
clauses. Assuming away aging effects, on average it would be indifferent to
rent a housing stock of given characteristics in the current or in some previ-
ous period if and only if renewal clauses exactly capture the impact of inflation.
Only in this case should the year of occupancy not be one of the explana-
tory variables on a hedonic regression explaining current rents in the survey
period.
However, there are good reasons to expect a negative mean impact of the
year of occupancy on present rents, meaning that owners would be giving up a
discount to sitting tenants renewing their rents, relative to the rents charged in
new contracts for housing of the same characteristics. In the first place, there are
theoretical models yielding what is known as tenure discounts (see, inter alia,
Guasch and Marshall 1987; Miron 1990; and Hubert 1995). Landlords know
that tenants will incur moving costs if they leave the unit. However, several fac-
tors work in the opposite direction. (i) Landlords also incur costs when a tenant
moves out of a unit, including the cost of reconditioning, the cost of marketing
a vacancy, and the rental income forgone during the vacancy. (ii) Landlords may
want to retain current tenants that have shown during some period to be “good”
tenants, minimizing wear and tear, avoiding trouble with neighbors, and so on.
(iii) There could be a tenant’s decreasing willingness to pay with the passage of
time. Thus, tenure discounts may appear as an equilibrium phenomenon in the
game played by tenants and landlords. Second, it should be remembered that, in
the Spanish case, new contracts signed between 1964 and 1986 have an auto-
matic clause compelling landlords not to evict tenants for up to two generations
except in a very restricted set of circumstances. This shifts considerable bargain-
ing power towards tenants in the rent renewal process, leading presumably to
large tenant discounts (Börsch-Supan 1986; Nagy 1997; and Basu and Emerson
2000). Moreover, rent increases for sitting tenants had to comply with an annual
governmental ceiling, typically linked to the previous year’s housing inflation
rate.
6. See Quigley (1979) for a survey of the early literature on housing, and Sheppard (1999) for a
recent one. Triplett (1990) contains a guide to the approach, as well as an illuminating account of
why statistical offices have resisted its use for 30 years.
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Therefore, as Hoffman and Kurz (2002) conclude, both the peculiarities of
housing markets and government regulations may result in tenancy discounts.7
To capture that phenomenon, the year of first occupancy should appear as an
explanatory variable of current market rents. Assume that in the current year T
there is a sample consisting of nt observations of housing units first rented at
time t = 1965, 1966, . . . , T , so that the sample size is n = ∑t nt . Denote by
r = ∪t {rt } the set of rents actually paid in year T ,X1 = ∪t {X1t } the set of
physical housing attributes, X2 = ∪t {X2t } the set of geographic characteristics,
and X3 = {Occup65,Occup66, . . . ,OccupT} an index set of years of occupancy
where, for each t,Occupt = 1 if the housing unit was first rented in year t and
Occupt = 0 otherwise. Each housing observation, indexed by i = 1, . . . , n, can
be described by
(ri, X1i , X2i , X3i ) ∈ r × X1 × X2 × X3.
Assume for the time being that the impact of physical and geographic char-
acteristics on rents is independent of the year the housing unit was first rented.
Under this simplifying assumption, rather than working with several separate
models rt = f (t, X1t , X2t , εt ), t = 1965, . . . , T , it is possible to work with a
single model:
r = g(X1, X2, X3, ε), (1)
where ε is a normally distributed random term with E[ε] = 0 and Var[ε] = σ 2ε .
Two empirical specifications of this model are contrasted using data from the
1980–1981 EPF. In the first place, the inspection of the sample rent distribution,
as well as the residuals of some preliminary linear specification of model (1),
led to the following semi-logarithmic functional form with parameters (α, β1, β2
and γ ):8
ln r = α + X1β1 + X2β2 +
∑
t
γt Occupt + ε. (2)
Second, as explained in the Appendix, a (ordinal) housing quality index (Qindex)
that summarizes the physical attributes has been constructed (see Table 2 for
some descriptive statistics of this variable). Thus, the empirical specification in
equation (2) will be contrasted with the following one where this index substitutes
for the entire vector X1 of physical characteristics:
ln r = α + β Qindex + X2β2 +
∑
t
γt Occupt + ν. (3)
7. There is ample empirical evidence on tenure discounts in several countries under different legal
arrangements. For the US, see, for instance, Lowry (1981), Goodman and Kawai (1985) and Clark
and Heskin (1982). For Germany, see Börsch-Supan (1986), Schlitcht (1983), and Hoffman and
Kurz (2002). For Spain, see Peña and Ruiz-Castillo (1984).
8. There is a large amount of literature on the appropriate choice of functional form for the hedonic
price function (see the discussion in Sheppard (1999), for example), but the simple log-linear form
generally performs well.
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In this case, consistently with the hedonic approach, the β coefficient can be
interpreted as the implicit marginal equilibrium price of housing quality.
There are several reasons why the specification in equation (3) might be pre-
ferred to the traditional one. (i) It permits the multicollinearity problem, which
may disturb the precise estimation of the physical attributes in vector X1, to be
overcome. (ii) By construction, the quality index is orthogonal to the remain-
ing indicators in the MCA. Therefore, using only Qindex in equation (3) filters
possibly irrelevant information as far as explaining market rents is concerned.
(iii) It permits estimating the impact of housing characteristics that, due to their
infrequency, would have no explanatory power in the traditional approach. For
example, in 1980–1981 only 14 out of 2,181 observations in the market rental sec-
tor lacked electricity. In the second approach, this attribute may influence market
rents through its effect on the housing quality index. (iv) The study of interac-
tions between the variables synthesized in the scalar index and other explanatory
variables become considerably easier. In this context, this is the case with respect
to the interactions with the year of occupancy.
From an empirical point of view, the comparison of equations (2) and (3)
shows that the coefficients of the geographical variables and the year of occupancy
follow essentially the same pattern. Interestingly enough, Peña and Yohai’s (1995)
procedure yields exactly the same 90 outliers in both cases. More important, in
spite of the reduction in the number of parameters, the goodness of fit in the
second model is essentially preserved (the R2 is equal to 0.586 and 0.578 in
the two models). The conclusion is that the two models perform equally well
in explaining 1980–1981 market rents.9 This reinforces the idea that the index
constructed in the Appendix can be appropriately interpreted as a housing quality
index, a fact that might prove important in other contexts. For instance, together
with household income or total expenditures, a meaningful housing quality index
could be used in the evaluation of household welfare or as a conditioning variable
in econometric studies of household demand. These considerations justify our
choice of the more parsimonious model that uses only the variable Qindex in the
analysis of both the 1980–1981 and the 1990–1991 market rental sectors.
Given the possibility of explaining a large part of the variance in market rents
by means of a satisfactory statistical model, it would appear that the next task is
to impute a monetary value to the flow of housing services provided by nonrental
dwellings. However, if the choices of tenure mode and housing characteristics
are not independent, the OLS estimation in the market rental sector might be
inconsistent, as well as unbiased.
In order to deal with this problem, we begin by recognizing that the total
sample of housing units, indexed by i = 1, . . . ,M , consists of two sets of
9. For a full discussion, including descriptive statistics and detailed regression results, see Arévalo
and Ruiz-Castillo (2004, Section III.2).
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observations: Uncensored observations in the set {i = 1, . . . , N | i ∈ },
where  denotes the set of market rental units, and censored observations in
{i = N + 1, . . . ,M | i /∈ } for which market rents ri are obviously not
observed. Let z∗ be the latent variable that determines the sample selection, so
that ri is only observable when z∗i ≥ 0. The implication is that the regression
model (3) has to be reformulated introducing a selection mechanism for z∗.
For that purpose, let Y be the vector that includes the variables that have
been shown in Arévalo and Ruiz-Castillo (2004) to have a significant role in
explaining market rents; namely a constant, the geographical variables, the year
of occupancy variables, the housing quality index and its interactions with the
year of occupancy (see Table 2 for some descriptive statistics, including mean
market rents). Then we have
ln ri = Yiβ + νI if i ∈  and z∗i = Ziδ + ui, (4)
where ν is normally distributed with E[νi] = 0 and Var[νi] = σν, Zi is the
set of variables that permit classifying each housing unit according to its tenure
mode, and u is a normally distributed variable with E[ui] = 0 and Var[ui] = 1.
Therefore,
Pr(i ∈ ) = 	(Ziδ) and Pr(i /∈ ) = 1 − 	(Ziδ),
where 	 is the distribution function of a standard normal.
In order to get consistent and efficient estimates, the model is estimated by
maximum likelihood methods, taking as initial values the results of the estima-
tion of Heckman (1979) selection model in two stages. In this context, the log
likelihood for each observation i, li , is equal to
wi ln 	([Ziδ + (ln ri − Yiβ)ρ/σ ]/(1 − ρ2)1/2)
− (wi/2)([ln ri − Yiβ]/σ)2 − wi ln(2π)1/2σν
if i ∈  and to wi ln 	(−Ziδ) if i /∈ , where ρ is the correlation coefficient
between the random terms ν and u, and wi is the blowing up factor for each
unit that permits to go from sample to population statistics. Given that the M
observations are assumed to be independent, the function to be maximized is
L(β, δ, σ, ρ | r, Y, Z) =
∑
i
li .
Provided that the selection of the Y and the Z variables ensures the model’s
identification, the consistent estimation of the β parameters and the availability
of the Y variables for all dwellings will make possible the imputation of a monthly
rent to all units in the nonrental sector.
Together with some of the physical attributes, the geographical variables and
the year of occupancy, the set Z includes the migrant condition of the household,
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measured in the EPFs by means of a question asking whether the household
had moved into the current municipality before or after 1975 or 1985 in the
1980–1981 and the 1990–1991 cases, respectively. According to Table 1, there
are 18,487 nonrental units in 1980–1981 and 18,180 in 1990–1991. However,
1,745 and 1,570 in these two periods lack information on building age, square
meters or, above all, year of occupation.10 Therefore, only 16,742 and 16,610
nonrental dwellings, representative of 7,044,514 and 8,782,425 population units
have been considered in 1980–1981 and 1990–1991, respectively. Descriptive
statistics about all Z variables in the market rental and the nonrental sectors are
presented in Table 3.
In 1980–1981, nonrental units seem to be larger and have more hygienic
services, water, garage, and telephone facilities than market rental dwellings;
moreover, nonrental units are older than rental market dwellings in spite of the fact
that all of the latter have been occupied after 1964. Relative to owner-occupied and
transferred units, rented dwellings seem to be more prevalent in more populated
municipalities and in the group of provinces with higher stock prices.11 The
differences in all these dimensions, however, are not very large. In 1990–1991
the pattern is exactly the same, including a greater proportion of detached units
with garden facilities in the nonrental sector.
Not surprisingly, the proportion of migrant households living in rented accom-
modations is more than four times that of those living in nonrental housing. Given
that the migration status of the household does not appear as a determinant of
housing rents, this is the variable that permits identification of equation (4). The
results of the estimation in both years are presented in Table 4.
In 1980–1981, but not in 1990–1991, there is evidence that the sample selec-
tion bias must be corrected.12 In the hedonic model in the upper panel of Table 4,
the observed pattern for the geographical variables is practically the same in both
models: First, the greater the population of the municipality where the unit is
located, the higher the estimated rent is; second, in 1980–1981 rents are higher in
the provinces where the housing stock has a higher mean price, whereas in 1990–
1991 rents are lower in those provinces where the housing stock has a lower mean
price. In any case, in both years greater quality implies larger market rents, but the
year of occupancy, as well as the interaction between this variable and housing
quality, displays opposite patterns in the two samples, a feature to which we will
return in the following sections.
10. Among the observations lacking some information, as many as 1,648 and 1,557 are occupied
as wages in kind or as a result of a private or a public transfer.
11. Provinces have been classified into four groups taking into account the average for 1980
and 1990 of mean provincial housing prices available at the Ministerio de Fomento, http://www.
mfom.estadisticas.
12. As pointed out in Table 4, in 1980–1981 the hypothesis of independence (H0: ρ = 0) should
be rejected at a 5% significance level.
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Table 3. The market rental sector versus the nonrental housing stock: Differences in physical
attributes, geographic characteristics, and other characteristics, 1980–1981 and 1990–1991.
1980–1981 1990–1991
Market Nonrental Market Nonrental
Physical attributes rental stock rental stock
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1. Hygienic services1
No bathroom inside the building 4.9 7.3 7.4 4.1
Less than one bathroom inside 13.9 8.0 74.1 68.9
One or more bathrooms 81.2 84.7 18.5 27.0
2. Water facilities
Hot water 72.2 78.8 91.5 95.3
3. Garage facilities
Garage 11.3 18.6 19.7 30.4
4. Telephone facilities
Telephone 37.1 53.6 65.5 79.8
5. Housing size
Less than 60 m2 18.6 9.5 17.8 7.5
61–90 m2 46.5 40.0 39.4 36.2
91–130 m2 28.3 36.3 30.3 38.9
More than 130 m2 6.6 14.2 12.5 17.4
6. Building age
More than 30 years 46.6 34.8 42.3 26.8
11–30 years 41.0 41.7 53.1 58.6
Less than 11 years 12.4 23.5 4.6 14.6
7. Building type
Detached house 18.1 38.9
8. Garden facilities
Garden 8.5 16.5
Geographical characteristics
1. Municipal size (inhabitants)
Less than 2,000 7.6 12.9 2.9 8.3
2,001–10,000 14.6 21.0 13.1 20.0
10,001–50,000 20.5 21.0 23.9 22.6
More than 50,000 57.3 45.1 60.1 49.1
2. Provinces with mean housing price2
Below 860 euros/m2 5.5 7.2 4.7 6.7
861–1,230 euros/m2 40.6 45.2 37.0 45.0
1,231–1,700 euros/m2 18.6 18.4 19.8 17.8
Above 1,700 euros/m2 35.3 29.2 38.5 30.5
Other characteristics
1. Years of occupation
More than 30 0.0 14.5 0.0 13.8
11–30 24.3 46.5 46.4 58.0
Less than 11 75.7 39.0 53.6 28.2
2. Migrant household head
Arrived during 1975–1981 13.3 3.2
Arrived during 1985–1991 12.9 3.4
Note: 1 In 1990–1991: less than a full bathroom; one bathroom; more than one bathroom.
2 See Table 2 for sources and provincial groupings.
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As has been noted before, there are good reasons for the rent actualization
process that takes place via rent renewal clauses for sitting tenants to proceed
more slowly than rent increases in new contracts due to inflation. According to
the 1980–1981 hedonic model in the upper panel of Table 4, the annual discount
generated by the difference between the sector’s inflation and the actualization
clauses is 4.7% during 1965–1973 and 13.8% during 1974–1980. The accumu-
lated discounts on rents of a dwelling of average quality in a given location,
relative to a comparable unit first rented in 1980, are very large indeed since they
range from 12.9% in a single year for units rented in 1979 to 74.3% for units first
occupied in 1965 (for further details, see Arévalo and Ruiz-Castillo 2004).
According to the 1990–1991 hedonic model in the same panel in Table 4, the
direct effect of the year of occupancy has two structural changes in 1975 and 1982,
but now the annual discounts decrease with time: they are 6.7% in 1965–1975, and
3.2% in 1976–1990. Likewise, the coefficients of the quality index tend to decrease
with time in the corresponding sub-periods. It would appear that, with the passage
of time, an increasing number of new contracts do include rent renewal clauses.
Nevertheless, the evidence of tenure discounts remains impressive, ranging from
3.2% in a single year for units rented in 1989 to 83.5% for units first occupied in
1965.13
To put these results in perspective, it is necessary to pay attention to the
actual inflation that took place during this period in the market rental sector.
Unfortunately, the Spanish INE measures the inflation rate for the entire rental
sector that also includes the rent controlled and the public rental sectors. Never-
theless, Arévalo and Ruiz-Castillo (2004) concluded that the large accumulated
discounts that have been estimated indicate that, relative to the official inflation
for the entire rental sector, the rent increases achieved through the renewal clauses
legally allowed after 1965 have been negligible—a situation that possibly requires
further research beyond this paper’s scope.
4. Hedonic Estimates versus Self-imputed Values
As explained in the Introduction, for all nonrental units the EPFs record the
monthly rent that an informer for the household occupying the unit thinks that their
dwelling would command if it were rented in the market at the time of the survey.
Answers to this question will be referred to as self-imputed rental values. Because
there are 13 and 4 nonrental units missing self-imputed values in 1980–1981 and
1990–1991, respectively, we are left with 18,474 and 18,176 units with complete
13. Interestingly enough, the discount estimated in Peña and Ruiz-Castillo (1984) for a sample
of housing units rented in the Madrid Metropolitan Area in 1975 is 8% per year. The accumulated
discount for the 1965–1975 period is 56.56%, a figure of the same order of magnitude as those shown
in Arévalo and Ruiz-Castillo (2004) for the same period using the 1980–1981 and 1990–1991 EPFs.
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information, representing 7,772,078 and 9,602,498 population dwellings in 1980–
1981 and 1990–1991, respectively.
On the other hand, given the parameter vector β estimated in the hedonic
model (4), knowledge of the Yi variables for a nonrental unit i will suffice to
produce an imputed rental value dependent on the year of occupancy. To obtain
a comparable imputation to the self-imputed value provided by the occupant it is
necessary to compute the rental value that the unit would command at the survey
time, that is, making the variable year of occupancy equal to 1980 and 1990 in the
two samples, 1980–1981 and 1990–1991, respectively.14 The resulting estimates
will be referred to as hedonic rental values.15
The frequency distribution of nonrental units by tenure mode and the quartiles
of the distribution of hedonic rental values (ordered from smaller to larger values)
are presented in the upper panel of Tables 5 and 6. In 1980–1981 more than 50%
of nonrental units are part of the owner-occupied market sector, and slightly more
than 25% are public housing. The remaining 20% is equally divided between
owner-occupied housing of unknown legal status and other units occupied as
wages in kind or as a result of a public or a private transfer. In 1990–1991 the
distribution by tenure mode is very similar, with a slight increase in the percentage
of public housing and owner-occupied of unknown legal status and a correspond-
ing decrease in the market sector and the last tenure mode. In both years, public
housing is overrepresented in the third and the fourth quartiles, whereas the other
three tenure modes are overrepresented in the second and, above all, in the first
quartile.
The comparison between hedonic and self-imputed values takes two forms.
In the first place, the ranking of nonrental units according to the two sets of values
has been compared in Arévalo and Ruiz-Castillo (2004). The main findings can
be summarized as follows. In both years, the percentage of units classified in the
same quartile of the two distributions is greater in quartiles I and IV. By tenure
mode, the minimum agreement between the two rankings takes place in the public
sector, which is not surprising because the large variety of public housing policies
developed in Spain since 1950 makes harder any kind of imputation in this sector.
In general, the agreement between the two classification criteria is somewhat
better in 1980–1981 than in 1990–1991. Thus, for example, in the first survey
14. In terms of the variables appearing in the regression models in the upper panel of Table 4,
making the year of occupancy equal to 1980 means making the variables Years of Occupation
During 1965–1973 and 1974–1980, Dummy for the 1965–1973 Occupation Period, and Qindex
During 1965–1973 equal to zero; whereas making the year of occupancy equal to 1990 means making
the variables Years of Occupation During 1965–1975 and 1976–1990, Dummy for the 1965–1975
and 1976–1982 Occupation Periods, and Qindex During 1965–1975 and 1976–1982 equal to zero.
15. There are 20 nonrental dwellings in 1980–1981 and 233 in 1990–1991 without information on
building age, as well as 62 in 1990–1991 without information on square meters. These units have
been assigned the mean value of those variables in the tenure mode to which they belong. In this
way, a housing quality index and a hedonic value for them have been computed.
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Table 5. A comparison of hedonic and self-imputed rental values for the nonrental housing
stock, 1980–1981.
Frequency distribution of the nonrental housing stock
by tenure mode and quartiles of the distribution of
hedonic values
Tenure mode All I II III IV
Owner-Occupied
Market sector 53.2 66.3 55.9 44.8 46.5
Public housing 26.5 3.6 19.7 37.9 42.7
Unknown legal status 10.0 15.7 10.9 8.1 6.0
Other 10.3 14.4 13.6 9.2 4.8
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Mean Monthly Rental
Difference between hedonic and
Values (in euros)
self-imputed mean values (%)
Quartiles of the Hedonic Values
Tenure mode Hedonic Self-imputed All I II III IV
Owner-occupied
Market sector 54.2 51.9 4.5 2.5 −1.0 3.5 8.2
(31.9) (45.2)
Public housing 73.3 57.8 26.9 −2.1 11.0 25.9 31.6
(26.4) (35.4)
Unknown legal status 46.9 44.4 5.8 −5.5 0.0 4.9 19.2
(26.8) (25.5)
Other 46.1 41.5 11.1 6.3 4.7 17.3 15.5
(25.1) (34.3)
All 57.7 51.6 11.8 6.3 2.8 11.2 16.4
(31.0) (41.1)
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
the Spearman coefficient ranges from a minimum of 0.49 for the public sector to
a maximum of 0.72 for the market sector, being equal to 0.66 for the nonrental
stock as a whole; instead, in 1990–1991 these values are equal to 0.46, 0.61, and
0.57, respectively.
Beyond this ordinal analysis, in the bottom panel of Tables 5 and 6 the dif-
ferences in percentage terms between mean hedonic and self-imputed values by
tenure mode are presented for the entire nonrental sector and the quartiles of
the distribution of hedonic rental values. In 1980–1981, mean hedonic values
are 11.8% greater than mean self-imputed values, although standard deviations
are generally lower for hedonic values.16 The proximity of mean values in the
first two quartiles is remarkable, but the discrepancies are somewhat larger in
quartile IV. Clearly, the main difficulty lies in assessing rental values for public
housing dwellings of greater than average quality. In 1990–1991, mean hedonic
values are 13.2% lower than self-imputed ones, and the latter present much larger
16. Mean hedonic values using the whole vector of physical housing characteristics instead of
the housing quality index are only 4.5% greater on average than self-imputed values. The standard
deviation is 29.4 versus 31.0 for our preferred choice of hedonic values in Table 5.
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Table 6. A comparison of hedonic and self-imputed rental values for the nonrental housing
stock, 1990–1991.
Frequency distribution of the nonrental housing stock
by tenure mode and quartiles of the distribution
of hedonic values
Tenure mode All I II III IV
Owner-occupied
Market sector 50.9 67.4 59.0 41.7 38.6
Public housing 27.9 5.8 16.8 38.0 46.3
Unknown legal status 12.8 16.1 13.8 12.2 9.8
Other 8.5 10.7 10.4 8.1 5.3
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Mean Monthly Rental
Difference between hedonic and
Values (in euros)
self-imputed mean values (%)
Quartiles of the Hedonic Values
Tenure mode Hedonic Self-imputed All I II III IV
Owner-occupied
Market sector 147.5 184.8 −20.1 −10.0 −19.9 −23.0 −22.7
(70.1) (166.0)
Public housing 191.8 195.9 −2.1 −18.3 −8.2 −5.0 1.4
(63.5) (122.5)
Unknown legal status 146.6 173.9 −15.7 −11.0 −19.2 −17.6 −13.9
(63.9) (127.2)
Other 140.7 149.8 −6.1 −5.6 −7.7 −9.5 −1.2
(59.3) (128.8)
All 159.2 183.5 −13.3 −10.3 −16.8 −15.1 −11.3
(69.7) (147.7)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
standard deviations. This time the largest differences in mean values are in quar-
tiles II and III. This seems to be due to the discrepancies found with respect to
owner-occupied units of intermediate quality and private or of unknown legal sta-
tus. As a matter of fact, differences in mean values in these sectors reach 20.1%
and 15.7%, respectively.17
Unfortunately, there exists no reliable statistical sources about housing prices
at a national level prior to 1985.18 However, there is no doubt about the existence
of a continuous increase in housing prices starting around 1985, a year before
Spain became a full member of the EU, which lasts until 1991, shortly before the
17. Francois (1989) presented preliminary research within the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) in
the US suggesting that owner estimates of implicit rents may be biased on average by as much as 10%
or 30% above actual values. However, he criticized that research for underestimating spot rents, and
pointed out that these results have not been confirmed by comparisons using data collector estimates.
More importantly, using a sample of new tenants consisting of 3,706 observations in 27 different
major metropolitan areas, this author showed that on average owner estimates are only 1.4% lower
than hedonic estimates. Kurz and Hoffman (2004) estimated hedonic functions in West Germany for
rents and self-imputed values in the rental and the owner occupied sectors, respectively, and found
that in most cases the sign and the size of the estimated coefficients do not differ significantly.
18. Bover (1993) contains a discussion of available statistical sources.
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beginning of a downswing in the general business cycle for the Spanish economy.
Evidence about housing prices for new transactions in Madrid presented in Bover
(1993) speaks of a previous boom around 1979. Based on such tentative evidence,
it would appear that the sign of the difference between hedonic and self-imputed
values might be influenced by the phase of the housing cycle in which the self-
imputations take place: a downswing in the case of the EPF collected from April
1980 to March 1981, and at the very end of an upswing for the EPF collected
from April 1990 to March 1991.
Be that as it may, the important question is whether such differences are large
or small for the purpose at hand. As explained in the Introduction, there are two
ways to apply the rental equivalence approach to the determination of the weight
that nonrental housing should receive in the CPI: Using the evaluation by experts
or occupants, or using the imputation obtained through hedonic methods. There-
fore, in the context of this paper, the answer to the above question hinges on
the implications for inflation of following either of the two versions of that
approach.
Among other classifications, the CPI system based in 1983 uses a 57-
dimensional commodity breakdown, where commodity 35 includes two main
items: A “nonrental housing services” component, whose official weight is esti-
mated using the self-imputed rental values declared in the 1980–1981 EPF by
occupants of these dwellings; and a second component mainly consisting of
“housing repair and maintenance.” Secondary housing must be excluded here
because, as explained in Section 2, no quality index has been computed for it.
Based on self-imputed values, our own estimates of the weights given to nonrental
housing services and commodity 35 as a whole are 9.4% and 13.5%, respec-
tively.19 The estimates of these two magnitudes using hedonic values are 10.4%
and 14.5%, respectively. Based on these two alternatives, interannual inflation
rates and the corresponding mean annual inflation for the entire period August
1985 to December 1992, are presented in columns 1 and 2 in the upper panel
of Table 7. The differences between these two series are small (of the order of
0.03 percentage points per year). Therefore, whether we use self-imputations or
hedonic values in assessing the importance of nonrental housing services in the
CPI has a small impact on the measurement of inflation from 1985 to 1992.
As an alternative, consider the possibility of abandoning the two versions
of the rental equivalence approach. This means dropping the nonrental housing
services component from the CPI altogether—as the Spanish INE did officially
in the 1992 base. In this case, our estimate of commodity 35’s weight becomes
4.6%. The mean inflation rate of the nonrental housing services component for
the 1985–1992 period is almost 3 percentage points below the mean inflation rate
for the economy as a whole (column 5 in Table 7). Therefore, overall inflation
19. The official values are 10.33% and 13.61%, respectively.
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Table 7. Inter-annual inflation rates and mean annual inflation rate for 1985–1992 and
1993–2000 (percentage points per year).
Treatment of non-rental housing
services in the CPI Nonrental
Hedonic Self-imputed Excluded housing
Base = 1983 imputations values from CPI prices
Subperiods (1) (2) (3) (4) = (1) − (3) (5)
August 1985–December 1985 2.82 2.84 3.05 −0.24 0.62
1986 8.26 8.30 8.66 −0.40 4.47
1987 4.63 4.66 4.89 −0.26 2.09
1988 5.91 5.89 5.77 0.13 7.26
1989 6.92 6.91 6.84 0.08 7.76
1990 6.61 6.62 6.78 −0.17 4.95
1991 5.61 5.60 5.55 0.06 6.23
1992 5.41 5.44 5.69 −0.28 2.63
Mean annual rate,
August 1985–December 1992 9.26 9.29 9.58 −0.33 6.45
Treatment of non-rental housing
services in the CPI Nonrental
Hedonic Self-imputed Excluded housing
Base = 1992 imputations values from CPI prices
Subperiods (1) (2) (3) (4) = (1) − (3) (5)
January 1993–December 1993 4.41 4.47 3.92 0.49 8.23
1994 4.40 4.41 4.33 0.07 4.92
1995 4.52 4.56 4.26 0.26 6.48
1996 3.78 3.85 3.23 0.55 7.85
1997 2.56 2.62 2.05 0.50 6.09
1998 1.76 1.80 1.39 0.36 4.20
1999 2.97 2.98 2.88 0.09 3.56
2000 3.99 3.99 4.00 −0.01 3.89
Mean annual rate,
January 1993–December 2000 4.19 4.24 3.81 0.38 7.19
rates are now significantly lower than before (column 3 in Table 7). In particular,
abandoning the rental equivalence approach represented by the hedonic alternative
would have led to a downward bias in inflation of 0.33 percentage points per year
during the 1985–1992 period (column 4 in Table 7). For comparison purposes,
when all sources of bias considered by the Boskin Commission in the US (Boskin
et al. 1996) are taken into account,20 it has been estimated that the official CPI in
Spain suffers from an upward bias of 0.6 percentage points per year (Ruiz-Castillo,
Izquierdo, and Ley 1999).
Apart from other minor changes relative to the 1983 base system, in the CPI
system based in 1992 commodity 35 includes only housing repair and main-
tenance, local housing taxes, and other items pertaining to nonrental housing,
20. The more important biases are due to the lack of substitution of a fixed weights CPI of the
Laspeyres type, and to insufficient price corrections in the presence of quality change.
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but excludes all imputations for nonrental housing services. In order to esti-
mate the inflation rates that would be obtained if the rental equivalence approach
were applied in the 1993–2000 period, there is no difficulty in creating an addi-
tional commodity 58 whose weight can be estimated using the hedonic or the
self-imputed rental values for nonrental housing. The sum of the weights for
commodities 35 and 58 in the hedonic and the self-imputed cases is 15.6% and
17.0%, respectively, whereas the weight of commodity 35 in our version of the
official system is 4.8%.21 In the absence of an official price index for commod-
ity 58, the index for commodity 33, “rents paid in rental housing,” has been
used. The estimates of the three series of inflation rates, as well as the informa-
tion about the evolution of commodity 33’s prices, appear in the lower part of
Table 7. Again, the differences between the two versions of the rental equivalence
approach in columns 1 and 2 are small (about 0.05 percentage points per year).
However, abandoning the rental equivalence approach as was done in the official
system (column 3) leads to an upward bias of 0.38 percentage points per year
(column 4)—a considerable amount.
The conclusion is inescapable. The two versions of the rental equivalence
approach lead to comparable inflation rates in both periods. Relative to this
option, dropping nonrental housing services from the CPI considerably reduces
the weight this sector receives in the price index and leads to a sizable bias in the
measurement of inflation, whose sign depends on the evolution of the price of
housing services relative to the CPI as a whole. During the 1985–2000 period, in
Spain this bias has been approximately 0.35 percentage points per year in absolute
terms.
5. Conclusions
The treatment of nonrental housing in the CPI is an old topic in index number
theory and practice. The issue requires a solution to two problems: (i) How to
determine the weight that nonrental housing should have in the CPI; and (ii) how
nonrental housing prices should be monitored over time. This paper has presented
an empirical contribution to the first question using the 1980–1981 and 1990–
1991 household budget surveys for Spain that are used to determine the official
CPI weights.
The starting point is the economic approach to price index numbers for con-
sumption goods and services. As far as housing is concerned, the standard of
living depends on the consumption of the housing services that a dwelling pro-
vides regardless of the tenure mode in which the dwelling is held. The empirical
21. The official weight itself is 5.30%. For a discussion of the reasons why our estimate differs
from the official one, see Ruiz-Castillo, Izquierdo, and Ley (1999, chapters 2 and 3).
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problem addressed in this paper is how to impute a rental value to the flow of
housing services provided by the nonrental housing stock in the base period. The
CPI weight for such services will then be equal to the ratio of the imputed value
to the total household expenditures in all commodities (including the nonrental
housing services in question).
In a novel version of the hedonic approach, it has been shown that the use of a
housing quality index leads to a satisfactory and parsimonious model explaining
market rents. To correct for the possible selection bias caused by systematic
differences in housing characteristics between the market rental sector and the
nonrental housing stock, a Heckman procedure has been used for the first time
in this context. In this way, the estimated coefficients of the variables explaining
market rents can be used to impute a rental value to nonrental housing units.
The more remarkable result of the paper is that, in spite of a thin market rental
sector whose working is likely to be affected in complex ways by a number of
public policies, occupants of nonrental housing in Spain and hedonic procedures
arrive, on average, at comparable imputed values. The differences between the
two procedures do not lead to important departures in average annual inflation
rates for the 1985–2000 period.
What is the explanation? On the statistical side, it should be remembered that
hedonic methods to explain rents and prices in rental and stock housing markets
have been working reasonably well for 30 years in a variety of institutional sce-
narios. On the other hand, it seems that people are keenly aware of how housing
markets work, so that self-imputed rental values, although more dispersed than
hedonic values, do contain useful information. Finally, it should be emphasized
that the aim of the exercise is simply to assess the weight that a given commod-
ity should be assigned in a large commodity space. Tolerable differences in the
numerator of the expression for determining that weight need not lead to signifi-
cant differences in the magnitude of the weight itself. This means that even in a
priori unfavorable circumstances, as long as good data are available it should be
quite possible to find an acceptable solution to the problem at hand.
There is no room in this paper for a proper discussion of how the prices of
nonrental housing services should be monitored over time. However, the treat-
ment of quality change, as well as depreciation and aging bias in both rental and
nonrental housing sectors is bound to rely on hedonic methods (see, inter alia,
Randolph 1988; Silver 1999; Hoffman and Kurz 2002; and Kurz and Hoffmann
2004).22 The results of this paper that add to the successful literature show that
these methods are worth pursuing.
This paper contains a warning for the specialists in the housing sector, the
officials in charge of these matters, and public opinion in general: In a country with
22. This is also the case in the more promising version of the user cost approach as exemplified in
Linneman and Voith (1991) and Crone, Nakamura, and Voith (2000).
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a large nonrental housing stock, eliminating its services from the CPI has been
estimated to give rise to a large bias in the measurement of inflation. Given the
alternatives, this is an unnecessarily crude form of dealing with a difficult problem.
It appears that there is room for national and international statistical offices to keep
experimenting within the sound economic approach assumed in this paper.
Appendix
This Appendix has two sections. Section A.1 is devoted to a summary of the
essentials of MCA as a descriptive technique for representing contingency tables,
that is, tables consisting of the frequencies with which a set of values of two or
more qualitative variables appear in a data set (see Tenenhause and Young (1985),
and Greenacre (1984) for a detailed treatment of MCA). Section A.2 contains an
application of MCA to the data on housing attributes coming from the 1980–1981
and 1990–1991 EPFs.
A.1. Description of MCA
Assume that there are N observations on housing units, each one characterized
by Q physical attributes, indexed by q = 1, . . . ,Q, and possibly correlated. Let
Jq be the number of categories or modalities of variable q, and let J = qJq
be the total number of categories with N  J . The data can be represented by
a (N × J ) matrix Z, whose element zij takes the value 1 when housing unit i
has modality j and zero otherwise, i = 1, . . . , N and j = 1, . . . , J . Note that
because each housing unit can only have one of the Jq categories of variable q,
the row sums in Z must all be equal to Q, i.e.,
∑
j zij = Q for each i = 1, . . . , N .
Denote by Nj the absolute frequency of category j , or the sum of elements in
column j,
∑
i zij = Nj , so that for each variable q,
∑
j∈Iq
∑
i zij = N . Finally,∑
i
∑
j zij = NQ.
The objective of MCA is to obtain a set of uncorrelated variables wk , indexed
by k = 1, . . . , K , with K < Q, where each wk is a linear combination of
the J categories. In other words, the objective of MCA is to find a (J × K)
matrix M where mjk is the contribution of the j th category to the new variable
wk , so that the information in the original data can be expressed through the
lower-dimensionality (N × K) matrix W defined by
W = ZM,
whose columns are the wk variables. As will be seen in A.2, the first variable w1,
which will be interpreted as a housing quality index, explains a large part of the
variance in the data.
The matrix M is constructed as follows. Denote by F the relative frequency
matrix, that is, F = (1/NQ)Z. The average column profile is the (N × 1) vector
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r = F1J with ri = 1/N for all i = 1, . . . , N , and the average row profile is
the (J × 1) vector c = FT 1N with cj = (Nj/NQ) for each j = 1, . . . , J . The
corresponding (N × N) and (J × J ) diagonal matrices are denoted Dr and Dc,
respectively. Define the (N × J ) matrix E by
E = D−1/2r (F − rcT )D−1/2c .
The element eTj ej in the diagonal of the (J × J ) matrix ETE is the χ2 distance
between the j th column profile in matrix F and the average column profile r ,
weighted by its relative frequency cj .23 The sum is called the total inertia, TI, and
it can be shown to be equal to (J/Q)− 1, namely TI =∑j eTj ej = (J/Q)− 1.
MCA computes the singular value decomposition of E, say UDαV T , where
U and V are orthogonal matrices, and Dα has J − Q nonzero eigenvalues.
In practice, because N  J , it is more convenient to compute the singular
value decomposition of the diagonal matrix ETE, say ETE = DλT , where
Dλ = D2α . The eigenvalues of Dλ quantify the inertia projected through each
of the associated eigenvectors (which form the columns of ). The eigenvectors
represent orthogonal directions of projection of centered column profiles. The
direction of the first eigenvector associated to the largest eigenvalue is the optimal
projection in the sense that it is the linear orientation that collects the maximum
disparity between individuals according to the Q variables. The second eigenvec-
tor is orthogonal to the first and represents the linear orientation that captures the
maximum residual disparity not taken into account by the first projection axis.
The remaining eigenvectors can be similarly interpreted until the total inertia is
accounted for byK orthogonal axis withK ≤ J−Q. In geometric terms, a change
of axis is being performed where the original space of profiles that has dimension
J − Q is projected in a reduced space with dimension K . The coordinates used
in the projection are contained in the (J × K) matrix M defined by
M = D−1/2c D1/2λ .
For each k, the eigenvalue λk represents a percentage of the total inertia, but
these percentages tend to be small and show a pessimistic idea about the proportion
of the projected inertia by each axis. Thus, Benzécri (1979) proposed considering
solely the relevant P axis, that is, the axis associated with those eigenvalues with
λp > 1/Q, p = 1, . . . , P , and P ≤ K . Analogously, he proposed to correct the
eigenvectors with the transformation
λcp = [Q/(Q − 1)]2[λp − (1/Q)]2
23. There is an analogous interpretation for the elements ej eTj in the diagonal of the (J ×J ) matrix
EET that refers to the rows.
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and show the proportion of inertia explained in relation to pλcp. In this way,
the dimensionality of the original matrix is reduced from J − Q categories to
P indicator variables losing a small quantity of information. Once the importance
of each indicator is evaluated in this manner, its interpretation can proceed in
terms of its correlation with all initial variables and the weight that each category
receives in the corresponding linear combination.
A.2. An Index of Housing Quality
In 1980–1981, there are Q = 8 qualitative variables and J = 23 categories,
whereas in 1990–1991 Q = 18 and J = 52. The number of observations with
complete information along these dimensions is 23,898 in 1980–1981 and 20,799
in 1990–1991,24 representing a population of 9,992,051 and 11,105,215 housing
units, respectively. The frequency distribution of all physical attributes in both
years is presented in columns 1 and 3 in Table A.1.
The percentage of inertia accounted for by the first two factors is 86.2%
and 12.1% in 1980–1981, and 73.2% and 10.5% in 1990–1991. Moreover, vari-
ables with two or more categories show a parabolic structure when depicted in
the plane defined by those two factors. This is a very frequent phenomenon,
known as the Guttman effect (Greenacre 1991), which simplifies the interpre-
tation. This effect reveals that whereas the first factor summarizes the order
structure of all modalities, the second factor shows an opposition between extreme
categories (low frequency) and average categories (high frequency) of a vari-
able. Thus, in the following the analysis will continue in terms of the first
factor that contains the relevant information about the variability among hous-
ing units as far as their physical attributes is concerned. Relative to the initial
number of variables and categories, this constitutes a very drastic simplification
indeed.
The correlation between the first factor and each of the Q physical attributes
for both years is shown in brackets in Table A.1. Among the eight common vari-
ables, hygienic services and water facilities are the most influential. Telephone,
building age, and heating facilities occupy an intermediate position above garage
and housing size, whereas having electricity is the most prevalent characteristic
in both years and that with the smallest correlation with the index whose mean-
ing is being discussed. Aport from hygienic services and water facilities, all of
the remaining six common variables gain some importance in the determination
of the index in 1990–1991; for instance, the correlation coefficient of garage
increases from 0.41 in 1980–1981 to 0.58 in 1990–1991. Nevertheless, having an
24. In 1980–1981 there are 73 observations without information on building age and in 1990–1991
this number is 289, plus 67 dwellings without information on housing size in square meters.
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Table A.1. Frequency distribution, normalized category weights, and correlations between
the first factor obtained by MCA and physical attributes in 1980–1981/1990–1991
(correlation in parentheses).
1980–1981 1990–1991
Normalized Normalized
Frequence weights Frequence weights
Physical attributes 9,992,051 = 100.0% 0.00 11,105,215 = 100% 0.00
Sample Size
1. Hygienic services (0.76) (0.72)
None or outside the dwelling 7.6 −8.09 1.8 −8.32
One full bathroom or less 77.3 −0.07 73.3 −0.98
More than a full bathroom 15.1 4.34 24.9 3.41
2. Water facilities (0.75) (0.70)
No water 3.8 −8.41 0.4 −10.00
Only cold water 19.4 −4.21 5.1 −6.94
Cold and hot water 76.7 1.49 94.6 0.32
3. Heating facilities (0.41) (0.65)
No heating 61.6 −1.73 10.9 −3.62
Mobile tools, ind. or central
heating 38.4 2.79 89.1 0.22
4. Garage facilities (0.41) (0.58)
No garage 83.6 −0.68 72.3 −1.02
Garage 16.4 3.47 27.7 2.41
5. Telephone facilities (0.62) (0.69)
No telephone 49.3 −2.17 22.7 −3.27
Telephone 50.7 2.29 77.3 1.14
6. Electricity (0.26) (0.33)
No electricity 0.9 −10.0 0.2 −8.72
Electric facilities 99.1 0.09 99.8 0.01
7. Housing size (0.40) (0.49)
Less than 60 m2 12.7 −2.59 9,0 −3.27
61–90 m2 41.6 0.36 37.8 −0.33
91–130 m2 33.4 1.43 33.4 0.32
More than 130 m2 12.3 1.65 15.8 0.81
8. Building age (0.59) (0.68)
More than 50 years 25.5 −3.25 11.3 −3.66
31–50 years 27.7 −1.49 13.6 −2.82
21–30 years 11.5 −0.22 25.0 −2.01
11–20 years 11.0 1.08 33.4 −0.81
Less than 11 years 24.3 2.68 16.7 2.14
9. Elevator facilities (0.80)
None 70.3 −1.82
Elevator 29.7 4.69
10. Air conditioning (0.80)
None 97.6 −0.08
Air conditioning 2.4 3.29
11. Water heating fuel (0.71)
None 5.4 −7.16
Wood, coal 2.1 −0.81
Gas 59.8 −0.89
Electric energy 16.2 0.41
Natural gas 16.6 3.65
12. Heating system fuel (0.57)
None 10.9 −2.25
Wood, coal 19.4 −1.35
Electric energy 40.6 0.15
Natural gas 16.0 2.65
(Continued)
“zwu003060368” — 2006/5/26 — page 857 — #28
Arévalo and Ruiz-Castillo Housing Costs in the CPI 857
Table A.1. Continued.
1980–1981 1990–1991
Normalized Normalized
Frequence weights Frequence weights
Physical attributes 9,992,051 = 100.0% 0.00 11,105,215 = 100% 0.00
Sample Size
13. Cooking fuel (0.72)
Wood, carbon 3.4 −4.97
Gas 76.8 −0.69
Electric energy 6.8 4.46
Natural gas 13.0 5.19
14. Garden facilities (0.62)
None 84.9 −0.01
Garden 15.1 0.04
15. Building type (0.73)
Inferior tenement 0.3 −4.91
One floor 35.6 −2.93
Two floors 4.6 −1.93
Three or more floors 59.5 2.21
16. Swimming pool (0.40)
None 98.8 −0.04
Swimming pool 0.2 4.69
17. Sports area (0.78)
None 98.9 −0.05
Sports area 1.1 5.49
18. Other community services (0.83)
None 52.7 −2.44
Some community services 47.3 3.16
elevator or air conditioning inside the house, or having sport facilities and other
community services around it, are the characteristics with the largest correlation
coefficients with the index in 1990–1991.
In each year, each modality j receives a certain weight mj , which can be
positive or negative, but the more frequent a modality j is, the closer to zero mj
will be. Columns 2 and 4 in Table A.1 present the rankings of modalities in both
years in terms of normalized weights mj ′ that preserve the sign and the ratios of
the original weights. The normalization consists of assigning the values −10 and
10 to the modalities with extreme mj according to the formula
mj
′ = mj(10/m∗),
where m∗ = max{|m1|, . . . , |mJ |}. In both years, the maximum normalized
weight is below 10, indicating that there is no modality that plays the exact
opposite role to the one that reaches the maximum negative value −10.
As far as the interpretation of the index is concerned, it is very revealing
that for all variables with two categories, the worst receives a negative weight
whereas the best receives a positive weight. For the remaining variables with
three or more categories, weights are always naturally ordered from worst to best
modality. In particular, the categories with the maximum negative influence in
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both years are having no hygienic services, no water (or only cold water), or no
light. Moreover, the first two are highly correlated with the index (see Table A.1),
which indicates that both of them are very influential in the interpretation. Among
the remaining common variables in both years, having a telephone, being in a
building less than 11 years old, and having a garage or more than a full bathroom
are categories associated with high and increasing positive weights. In 1990–1991,
having a swimming pool, elevator, electric energy or natural gas for cooking, and
a sports area are the modalities exercising the maximum positive weight in the
index.25
In our opinion, both the correlation between the index and the different vari-
ables and the way the weights are naturally ordered for all variables without
exception, indicate that the first factor obtained from MCA can be safely inter-
preted as an index of housing quality. The index values assigned to each housing
unit indicates the positive or negative deviation relative to the quality attributed to
the “average housing unit” with the more frequent categories, whose index value
is zero by construction.26
The housing quality index has, of course, several shortcomings. First, the
index does not take into account the heterogeneity in the way that certain cate-
gories influence quality for different housing types. For instance, heating in the
Canary Islands or Andalucía should receive a smaller weight on quality than in the
north of the country. Although such differences could be recognized by computing
a different index for each housing type, the resulting quality indexes will not be
comparable across types. Consequently, a single housing quality index including
the categories “no heating” and “heating of any kind” has been computed. Sec-
ond, the housing quality concept is restricted to the Q variables for which there is
information in the EPFs. Judging from the existing hedonic literature on housing,
there are several quality dimensions that are potentially important, such as how
well preserved dwellings are, as well as basic neighborhood characteristics like
pollution, safety, public transport facilities, and distance to the main centers of
economic and recreational activity.
In any case, the real issue is whether, with all its shortcomings, the housing
quality index here constructed behaves well in explaining market rents, an issue
covered in Section 3 of the paper.
25. For the more salient features in a comparison between 1980–1981 and 1990–1991, see Arévalo
and Ruiz-Castillo (2004).
26. The common categories associated with the average housing unit in both years are the fol-
lowing: Building age between 20 and 30 years, presence of electricity facilities, one bathroom
(although perhaps not a full one), hot water, between 61 and 90 m2, and without a garage. The
average dwelling in 1980–1981 does not possess telephone or heating, whereas in 1990–1991 it
has both and it is situated in buildings with more than three floors, without an elevator, air condi-
tioning, garden, swimming pool or sports area; gas is the fuel used for cooking and heating water,
whereas for the remaining heating uses, served by mobile tools, this fuel is combined with electric
energy.
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